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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines numerous linkages between two influential terrorist organizations 
operating in Sub-Saharan Africa, Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM), and what would be the political and security ramifications on United States 
foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa stemming from the enhanced partnership 
between these groups. I argue that containment of these groups and their current 
operations through overwhelming military supremacy does not project a sustainable way 
forward for not only the United States, but more importantly, for the international 
community. The ongoing instability in the Sahel could have enormous second- and third-
order negative effects on the entire region. The threat both groups represent with their 
freedom of movement should not be underestimated. Both receive some form of active 
and passive support from their respected indigenous populations, and as they evolve, are 
becoming more sophisticated in their training, funding, and methods of employment. 
Regional Islamic safe havens could be created through the union of Boko Haram and 
AQIM as their modes of shared ideology, financing, and tactics move forward. Therefore, 
a strategy of moderate containment through enhanced engagement by leveraging all lines 
of operations, coupled with soft and hard power, will increase the likelihood of long-term 
stability. 
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1. THE PROBLEM 
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, numerous 
global terrorist and criminal networks are under persistent threat from military force on 
many fronts. These networks, facing mounting pressure from mainly Western nations, 
have had to reassess their strategies and find different levels of coordination and 
corporation in order to survive. Some of these networks were thought to be on the verge 
of collapse, while others have actually grown and evolved into state-like organizations. 
In just the past five years, two notorious terrorist organizations operating in 
Africa, Boko Haram and the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are morphing 
into organizations that are placing enormous pressure upon the African states of Mali, 
Algeria, Niger, and Nigeria. See map in Figure 1. In 2010 alone, AQIM, which derives 
the majority of its origin from the GIA in Algeria extends its reach well outside Algeria, 
was responsible for the deaths of more than 170 Algerian Security Forces, extensive 
bombing campaigns, kidnappings, and other acts of terror.1 In 2012, while operating in 
Mali, AQIM attacked, captured, and then subsequently murdered more than 50 Malian 
soldiers who were on patrol in the northeastern part of the country, causing such turmoil 
within the Malian military, that a coup ensued from U.S. military trained Captain 
Amadou Haya Sanogo.2 Additionally, AQIM as demonstrated by the kidnapping of the 
Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler in 2009, while he was in Western Niger.3 
In Nigeria, the terrorist organization Boko Haram, which operates predominantly 
in the northern region of the country, started out with no more than 16 members in the 
                                                 
1 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 2013,” (n.d.). 
2 Ibid. 
3 LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Other Sources of Instability in Africa. 112th Cong. 
(April 25, 2012), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg73998/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg73998.pdf. 
 2 
early 1990s, and as of 2013 now boasts more than 500 active personnel.4 Boko Haram is 
an Islamic organization that believes the northern territory of Nigeria is corrupted by 
Christians and government security forces flowing in from the south. This organization 
claims responsibility for numerous terrorist attacks on an array of targets, including 
military and police forces, and places of Christian worship. These attacks, especially ones 
inflicted upon church congregations, are causing significant friction between the 
country’s two main religions, Islam and Christianity, to the point that a civil war in 
Nigeria is of grave concern to its policymakers. 
 
Figure 1.  Depicted Problem Area5 
The significance of the problem is the audacity and tenacious abilities of both 
Boko Haram and AQIM to possibly drive a psychological wedge between the legitimacy 
of the state and its ability to provide essential services, security, and prosperity to the 
affected region. The constant presence of inequality between relative deprivation and 
                                                 
4 Abimbola O. Adesoji, “Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the 
Response of the Nigerian State,” Africa Today 57, no. 4 (2011): 98–119, 
https://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/africa_today/v057/57.4.adesoji.html. 




acute wealth in Algeria, Nigeria, Niger, and Mali is creating a cultural insurgency.6 Of 
much importance is the fact that this populace is very technologically aware. The 
explosive nature of globalization and connectivity along with the advent of free trade, 
instant communication, internet usage, social media, and mass transportation systems are 
imposing extreme stress on state governments to weed out corruption in numerous 
African states and to deliver needed services. Failure in doing so is only helping to 
facilitate the population’s appeal for rogue non-state actors who consistently win them 
over through a well-orchestrated public relations campaign. The two most predominant 
choices Africans typically have are to embrace capitalistic behaviors or models, which in 
developing nations translate into large groups of people suffering from wealth inequality, 
or embracing puritanical Islamic practices, which call for humans to turn their backs on 
self-gratification, over-consumption of resources, strict obedience to the literal meanings 
of the Quran, and to surrender oneself to God. The solution and approach I propose is for 
African nations to work diligently toward recognizing these rogue groups as 
organizations who should have some voice in their government’s policies. This approach 
is a form of integration to quell ongoing instability and turmoil, while building a strategy 
of reconciliation and reintegration. These terrorist organizations will only halt their 
violent attacks on innocent civilians and government security forces when they know that 
their grievances are being addressed, their safe havens are not permanent, the populations 
over which they work to achieve dominion are not viable options, and that their policies 
have some kind of say in African politics. 
2. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the political and security ramifications on United States foreign policy 
toward the Sahel region and beyond, emanating from the creation of an alliance between 
Boko Haram and AQIM? If this linkage is possible, what would be the impact and 
response from U.S. African Command (AFRICOM), and how would this possible 
alliance affect United States foreign policy initiatives in the region? 
                                                 
6 David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” IO 
Sphere (2006): 29–35, http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf. 
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3. IMPORTANCE 
The scope of this thesis will focus on the factors that allow Boko Haram and 
AQIM to not only survive, but also create a way for these two organizations to merge 
into a regional alliance. This thesis will not only draw on persistent factors that are setting 
conditions for a closer partnership between these two groups, but will also analyze 
contrast and comparison versus case studies. The scope of this thesis is meant to draw out 
a few additional questions: How might the merger of Boko Haram and AQIM influence 
not only U.S. foreign policy in the region, but how would the entire region itself be 
impacted if these two organizations were to form a more sophisticated alliance? What is 
the current U.S. strategy toward both Boko Haram and AQIM? What strategy would the 
U.S. pursue if these two groups morphed into a regional state-like structure, and what 
U.S. strategy would most likely facilitate the end of these groups? These results may have 
implications for other persistent terrorist organizations worldwide, as more resources and 
approaches can be utilized against other similar factions or affiliates. An immediate 
strategy is to not just to allow U.S. policymakers and strategist to target these groups 
through a broad-based U.S. counterterrorism (CT) strategy, but also working with host 
nation affected countries, while simultaneously using the influence and resources of the 
African Union (AU) and its action arm, the African Standby Force. This strategy is 
intended to not only be a strategy against Boko Haram and AQIM, but is also one that 
can be emulated and used as a template against other non-state actors and terrorist groups 
globally. 
The relationship between Boko Haram and AQIM is one that is currently being 
manifested through shared ideology, funding, grievances, future intentions, and overt 
resistance to globalization.7 The linkages between Boko Haram and AQIM are becoming 
more profound and are causing the European and African Unions significant concern, 
which is understandable because of geographical proximity. In recent times U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts have had the majority of its focus and resources on the Middle 
East and Central Asia. This lack of focus on Africa is leaving portions of its population 
                                                 
7 Tore Bjorgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward (New York: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2005). 
 5 
extremely vulnerable to the impact of terrorism, smuggling, arms proliferation, and 
power vacuums, while creating environments awash with fundamentally corrupt 
government officials.8 Some of this has to do with large swaths of land in Africa 
classified as “ungoverned territory” making these two groups capable of affecting the 
region from Morocco in the west, to Libya in the east, and through to the northern region 
of Nigeria in the south. 
The threats projected by both Boko Haram and AQIM are ones that are gaining in 
momentum, strength, and influence in the region. These factors are a direct result from 
the aftermath of the Arab Spring in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia.9 The fall of the Gaddafi 
regime in Libya and the subsequent mass distribution of small arms and light weapons to 
militia groups, non-state actors, bandits, and gangs will have lingering effects throughout 
Sub-Saharan Africa for possibly decades to come.10 These missing weapons from large 
depots inside of Libya constitute a viable threat because a number of these states after the 
Arab Spring are still extremely vulnerable to large-scale instability. This coincides with 
areas of land that are ungoverned as in the case of Southern Algeria, Southern Libya, 
Southern Morocco, and even parts of Tunisia. Most recently the military coup that took 
place in Mali has links to the fallout of the Libyan debacle, because the fighters who were 
paid by the Gaddafi regime lost their livelihoods, and due to being black African were 
forced to leave Libya taking with them significant quantities of small arms and light 
weapons. The greater fear, though, is how many lightweight shoulder-fired surface to air 
missiles (SAMs) are being circulated in the Sahel, southern portions of the Maghreb 
countries, and quite possibly in West Africa. This unorganized non-regulatory movement 
constitutes an even graver threat because these disenfranchised mercenaries from Libya 
are now operating in the Sahel and West Africa with impunity while simultaneously 
forming ties to other groups such as AQIM and Boko Haram. A hybrid of rebel and 
Islamic militant groups are now consolidating their power and resources, and have 
recently announced a new Islamic state within Mali. 
                                                 
8 Bjorgo, Root Causes. 
9 LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Other Sources of Instability in Africa. 
10 Ibid. 
 6 
If Boko Haram and AQIM become more coordinated and robust in their 
organization, they will have better opportunities to use human trafficking, illicit drug 
trade routes, and accumulate more influence through their acquisition of small arms and 
light weapons. Due to the nature of geographical proximity to the European continent, 
their influence will have a global impact. This threat equates to a refined operational 
capability as these groups learn, improve their procedures, and mature in command and 
control mechanisms. The larger concern is how to quell these organizations from 
mutating into a possible newly defined Islamic safe haven in the Sahel region. History 
has shown that when existing governments sense these kinds of threats and possibilities, 
their response is to escalate the use of force, to the point where this escalation plays right 
into the narrative of the rogue actors, creating an environment of hate and distrust for the 
established government. This then creates a perpetual cycle of conflict, which is what the 
established government is hoping to prevent. 
Finally, it is imperative that the U.S., in concert with its NATO and AU allies, 
devise a strategy that is conducive and appropriate to the measured response emanating 
from an alliance between Boko Haram and AQIM. AFRICOM will undoubtedly play a 
larger role in the future as a combatant command, but the need for the AU to handle the 
bulk of the problems and issues involving the merger of Boko Haram and AQIM is more 
important than ever before. This will be inevitable as resources, capabilities, and force 
projection comes under increasing pressure due to budgetary constraints. The motto, 
“African solutions to African problems,” needs to be to pretext for the future of 
containment, intervention, and engagement on the African continent.11 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of this thesis is to thoroughly research Boko Haram and AQIM 
through their geographical disposition, organizational constructs, mission statements, 
number of known passive and active members, how relative each organization’s threat is 
to stability in the region, and most importantly, are there any overt or covert intentions by 
these organizations to morph into a state-like organization in the Sahel. This thesis will 
                                                 
11 LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Other Sources of Instability in Africa. 
 7 
consist of five major chapters of research and a final chapter for purposes of a conclusion 
and recommended strategy for both military planners and government policymakers. The 
methodology for this thesis is to first identify what the significance of the problem is, and 
then to define what Boko Haram and AQIM want, while understanding and determining 
how they have evolved. Using this historical construct, Boko Haram and AQIM can then 
be understood in how to predict future tactics and behavior that they might employ 
against government security forces, and other non-aligned ethnic groups. This approach 
and method will help future planners understand where weaknesses lie, and what and 
where effective means could be utilized to thwart possible modes of operation. Equipped 
with understanding the nature of these organizations, a sustainable way forward and a 
means to an end for breaking up an alliance between Boko Haram and AQIM can be 
undertaken. Taking a thorough look into how these two groups share common ideologies, 
funding, tactics, and resistance to current government strategies can then assess present 
U.S. policy to determine what approaches might work. The final chapter of this thesis 
brings all five chapters into a summary conclusion, with the intent to make 
recommendations for future military and policy planners to prevent the merger of Boko 
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II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The significance of the problems confronting local African governments having to 
deal with grievances emanating from Boko Haram and AQIM are profound and layered. 
The problems associated with a more integrated coordination between the two groups in 
conjunction with the movement of illicit drugs, human trafficking, small arms and light 
weapons proliferation, the wasteful implementation of humanitarian aid, and the 
complete collapse of the Libyan regime are problems that are not going away, at least in 
the near term. Government corruption and the mismanagement of precious resources are 
only helping to legitimize the narrative from both Boko Haram and AQIM, and is further 
assisting their cause in spreading their ideology and frustrations. Disenfranchised youths, 
who are consistently being marginalized, suffer from acute wealth inequality while living 
in ungoverned territory that boasts no sustainable infrastructure, leaving them with little 
or no other viable options than to join these groups and help promote their cause. 
B. LEVELS AND TYPES OF COORDINATIONS BETWEEN BOKO 
HARAM AND AQIM 
At the tactical level of operation, Boko Haram and AQIM build networks through 
campaigns of attacks on government security forces and innocent civilians. These attacks 
are becoming even more deadly as these two groups train with one another, and share up-
to-date information in order to maximize their objectives. Some of the recent successes 
from Nigerian security forces, and most recently from the French intervention into Mali, 
are forcing Boko Haram and AQIM to have a more integrated operational relationship for 
basic means of survival.12 Although under pressure from different fronts throughout the 
Sahel, both groups still have found adaptable ways to operate inside ungoverned spaces. 
The tactics mainly used by Boko Haram and AQIM focus on “hit and run attacks” are 
mostly on—but not limited to—what are considered “soft targets”: churches, schools, and 
                                                 
12 Conn Hallinan, “The U.S. and Africa: The Next Four Years,” Foreign Policy In Focus, Institute for 
Policy Studies, November 26, 2012, http://www.fpif.org/blog/the_us_and_africa_the_next_four_years. 
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hospitals.13  However, in recent years both groups are implementing more brazen attacks 
on fortified police and army outpost. The January 21, 2012, attack inflicted more than 
200 fatalities from eight different explosions, targeting army barracks and immigration 
offices and state security offices in the northern city of Kano.14  These attacks are more 
sophisticated and coordinated with the use of direct and indirect fire assets, coupled with 
the introduction of Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs).15 
Another important point of concern is that Nigerian security forces have better 
control of its border region—mainly with Niger. As a result, Boko Haram has had to seek 
help from AQIM. AQIM, knowing the pressure that group is facing, is using a form of 
“gang initiation” tactics. If Boko Haram can prove to AQIM that it has the ability to stage 
successful attacks, than AQIM will likely funnel more resources to Boko Haram, so 
without serious interdiction between the two groups, more attacks and kidnappings will 
be on the rise in the region.16 
One of the cumbersome aspects in combating AQIM is the group’s ability to build 
a structure that is highly decentralized. AQIM structure is based on containing a supreme 
commander, a council of notables, and a Shura Council, so there are control measures 
within the organization that make it more centralized, but the group itself operates as 
decentralized, especially at the tactical level.17 Although this structure is overly stated by 
the group, it gives its local subordinate commanders the luxury to commence attacks and 
kidnappings without serious oversight. This decentralization in how the group projects 
itself gives it the latitude to connect with other groups such as Boko Haram, and further 
helps the group survive after sustaining attacks from government security forces.18 
Although this method of operating lacks character in making it a traditional force, which 
                                                 
13 Adesoji, “Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram.” 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Other Sources of Instability in Africa. 
17 Andre Le Sage, “The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Strategic Forum 268 




profoundly impacts the strategic level of operation, it at a minimum ensures that the 
group remains a persistent threat. 
Boko Haram and AQIM are increasingly more influential at the operational and 
strategic levels. Their effective tactical operations are now more sophisticated and 
coordinated with deadly results against high payoff targets, forcing the international 
community to pay more attention to their methods and objectives, while allocating more 
resources to fight the problem.19 Most recently, AQIM declared a portion of northeastern 
Mali as their zone of isolation or breakaway state prompting the French to intervene on 
behalf of the Malian government. Before this intervention, both Boko Haram and AQIM 
were considered to be groups that were dangerous, but were weakened by the successes 
of various government security force crackdowns, but since the fall of the Gaddafi 
regime, and ongoing instability throughout North Africa, both groups have used this 
situation to regain momentum, and are now changing the dynamics at the strategic 
level.20  What is of increasing concern is in how fast both groups have gained strength 
and lethality in recent years. Various governments, including the U.S., are now making 
comparisons to a merger between Boko Haram and AQIM to the events leading to the 
September 11 attacks, in that the Taliban and AQC were thought to be a threat, but not to 
the level in where they could launch attacks on mainland America.21  In a recent speech, 
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that, “The situation in Libya with the 
downfall of Muammar Gaddafi, has opened up new linkages between groups like Boko 
Haram and AQIM. This new dynamic has opened up a whole new Pandora’s box of 
terror throughout the subcontinent.”22 
The conditions that are generating an enhanced partnership between Boko Haram 
and AQIM are being manifested out of five different sets of issues: persistent African 
government corruption, large swaths of land termed as “ungoverned spaces,” the 
explosive and lucrative contraband trade involving intellectual property/movement of 
                                                 





humans, the recent downfall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, and the proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons.23 The irony of this growing alliance between these two 
groups is that what host nations are seeking to prevent, they are actually helping to create. 
Boko Haram historically has never overtly stated that it wishes to become a 
transnational terrorist organization.24 Its primary objective is more isolationist in nature, 
but it is being forced to work with other internationally recognized terrorist organizations, 
such as AQIM, in order to survive because of harsh Nigerian government security force 
crackdowns.25 AQIM officially wants to become a transnational terrorist organization, 
and needs to develop alliances with groups like Boko Haram in order to fulfill its stated 
mission, which is the creation of an Islamic state in the Sahel region.26 Both groups use 
ineffective and corrupt government policies to project their grievances upon the 
population.27 
Mismanagement of government resources, heavy-handed and brutal government 
crackdowns in Boko Haram and AQIM’s zones of operation, only play right into their 
public relations narrative. The populations in these areas suffer from wealth inequality 
and no real access to essential government services, while being in a constant state of 
insecurity. This in turn creates distrust for the government due to a lack of transparency, 
further fueling deep-seated frustrations. The ongoing turmoil and plight the populations 
in these areas must endure, gives them little opportunity to move out of their current state 
of living, thus making the appeal to join groups like Boko Haram and AQIM more 
inviting.28 
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C. CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS 
The horrific aftermath of the colonial slave industry, followed by the “scramble 
for Africa” from 1870-1914, left huge psychological scars upon Africans.29 Africa was 
carved up without any regard to how it would impact the people living there. 
International boundaries and lines were established and drawn right through historical 
tribal and ethnic areas, causing profound hardship and conflict between local 
populations.30 Since the end of the Cold War, numerous African nations found 
themselves at a unique crossroads; whether to carry on with socialistic methods of 
governance, while maintaining strict control over their populace, or to embrace and 
change to multi-party and democratic modes of governing.  This was mainly caused by 
the demise of the Soviet Union, which subsequently dried up an enormous amount of 
funding for African regimes. This vacuum of resources forced African governments to 
make significant structural changes in ways of governing. When the thrust of ethnic 
nationalism and mass independence movements took their roots in Africa starting in the 
late 1950s through the 1960s, Africans generally regarded capitalism as a derivative of 
colonialism, so they were quick to embrace socialism.31 In many respects this made 
development prospects in Africa cumbersome, while simultaneously setting the stage in 
making Africa one gigantic battleground between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
This Cold War fight only made matters worse for Africans, and in the end, when the 
Soviet Union fell, the U.S.—outside of using Africa as a vehicle for resource 
extraction—lost its desire to stay heavily involved in the building up of regimes and 
institutions, even to the point of where humanitarian aid and funding dropped by 50 
percent.32 This disengagement by the U.S. left African leaders on their own to deal with 
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nation states that were subjected to human and resource extraction, persistent conflict 
between superpowers, and finally being awash with substantial stockpiles of weapons.33 
In contemporary times, African governments are making profound changes in 
ways of governance. Much of this change is from the creation of multi-party systems, and 
forcing elected officials to abide by term limits. The electoral processes in areas where 
Boko Haram and AQIM operate have generated mixed results. On one hand the elections 
give Africans a voice into which party or leader they want to lead their country, while on 
the other hand tends to leave minority groups marginalized. Additionally, an acute 
patronage system has taken root further enabling rampant corruption. Internationally, 
Nigeria is currently ranked 136th out of 176 nations in overall corruption.34 As patronage 
systems become more established, and large amounts of revenue and donor aid end up 
missing, or being stowed into offshore bank accounts, Boko Haram and AQIM use this 
corruption as a way to connect with the population.35 As long as African nations remain 
thoroughly corrupt in not accounting for funds while marginalizing distinct minorities 
from having a voice into policy-making, Boko Haram and AQIM will use these problems 
as a way to drive a wedge between the power of the state to deliver on promises, to its 
people, while offering an alternative to join in their cause. 
D. THE ILLICIT DRUG SUPER HIGHWAY 
1. The Transnational Drug Trade in Africa 
Over the past twenty years, drug trade in Africa has increased exponentially. This 
trade originates from Latin America by way of “Highway 10” (in reference to the 10th 
parallel).36 Geography plays a pivotal role in this relationship in that Dakar Senegal is 
only 2,575 kilometers away from the Brazilian town of Fortaleza.37 In light of this close 
geographical proximity, West Africa is now a significant hub/staging base for drugs, 
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especially cocaine being sent into Europe.38 This might not directly impact America’s 
security interest, but it does impact some of America’s closest allies in Europe. Large 
sums of money procured from drug sales go directly into the hands of some the most 
dangerous drug dealers in the world. Thus, these funds are completely unaccounted for, 
and supply huge payoffs for terrorist organizations like Boko Haram and AQIM to find 
quick and easy money, in order to purchase arms, logistical resources, and to finance its 
operations while bringing in more recruits. More importantly though, are the negative 
effects inflicted upon Africans. In Senegal alone, cocaine sales to Europe are more than 
six times the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).39 A 2005 United Nations report 
on West Africa highlighted this ongoing problem stating the following: 
The sub-region continues to be confronted by the phenomenon of violent 
military adventurism to seize power. Within the last 12 months, for 
instance, several West African countries have had coup attempts: Burkina 
Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania. Moreover, it has emerged 
that some members of the security and armed forces are associated with or 
otherwise involved in such illicit activities as smuggling of arms, drugs 
and natural resources, human trafficking, extortion at roadblocks and 
money-laundering. 40 
This new shift in moving drugs to Europe by way of Africa is primarily due to the 
decline in cocaine usage in North America. “Cocaine usage in the U.S. is down by more 
than 50 percent since 2008.”41 Transnational drug trafficking in Africa now accounts for 
more than $2 billion as of 2010.42 The overall volume of drugs being sold in Europe 
consistently places a large strain on its internal police and military forces. The spike in 
drug trade from West Africa has now reached historic levels. Drug seizures by security 
forces have dramatically climbed since serious tracking was implemented. In the year 
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2000, European security forces seized 97 kilograms of cocaine. Comparatively, in 2007, 
60 times that amount, (6,000 kilograms) were seized.43 
E. GUNS, GUNS, EVERYWHERE: THE THREAT OF SMALL ARMS AND 
LIGHT WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 
The proliferation and distribution of small arms and light weapons in Africa, 
dating back to the beginning of the Cold War to the present, has reached unprecedented 
levels. There are now an estimated 500 million small arms distributed throughout the 
world, 150 million of those on the African continent.44 Small arms and, more 
specifically, the AK47, are now “Africa’s Weapon of Mass Destruction,” according to 
the Carnegie Endowment for peace.45 Most recently, the fall of the Libyan government 
and its longtime dictator Muammar Gaddafi, highlights the importance of how real the 
threat of instability is to the region of North Africa, and what this vacuum of power 
means for the international community. In the wake of the Arab Spring, the second- and 
third-order effects from governmental regimes collapsing as in the case of Libya, 
constitute a legitimate focus on international law in order to limit small arms and light 
weapons distribution throughout the world.46 
In a technologically underdeveloped society, in the twentieth century, 
ultimate power resides not in those who control the means of production, 
as postulated by Marx, but in those who control the means of destruction, 
captured by the soldier/bandit with an AK47.47 
During the Cold War, much focus was placed upon negotiations for the control 
and management of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, but small arms and light 
weapons were not given the same attention because the nature of the threat to instability 
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was not viewed as a profound problematic factor.48 The result in this lack of enforcement 
through the implementation of treaties, now creates a major challenge and yet a possible 
opportunity for the entire world. The events resulting from the Arab Spring in North 
Africa, especially Libya, coupled with the mass distribution of small arms and light 
weapons in its aftermath, creates a whole new dynamic for the U.N. to contend with. In 
light of the ongoing uncertainty throughout North and Sub-Saharan Africa, implementing 
swift and broad changes on how nations build, buy, and sell small arms and light 
weapons should now be at the forefront on issues in dealing with transnational terrorist 
organizations. The importance of this issue cannot be underestimated and is paramount 
for the prospects of stability in developing nations.49 
One of the most cumbersome aspects for the U.N. involving small arms and light 
weapons distribution will be the implementation of control mechanisms through treaties 
and oversight with legitimate state actors. Enforcement through U.N. Security Council 
resolutions will be a key starting point. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent 
pilferage of large weapons depots in that country are now being repeated in Libya.50 Both 
of these countries are examples of what happens after the state system collapses and what 
this insecurity does to their applicable regions. When people understand and feel their 
state security system will have no real means to provide support and protect them from 
threats within or externally, fearing for their very lives they naturally seek out whatever 
means possible to provide their own security. When there is an overabundance of small 
arms and light weapons, as was in Iraq, and now with Libya, simultaneously possessing 
acute tribal factions, the byproduct becomes a powder keg for mass instability and sheer 
violence. The fallout over the war in Libya also brings heightened concern to its 
neighboring countries, most notably Algeria and Egypt, because these countries have 
long and porous borders that are difficult to control and manage.51 With the advent of 
                                                 
48 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Combating the Proliferation. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Jon B. Alterman, “Seeing Through the Fog: Transitional Governments in Libya and Elsewhere,” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 6, 2011, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/111011_MCU_Libya_Talk.pdf. 
51 Alterman, “Seeing Through the Fog.” 
 18 
globalization emanating from the end of the Cold War, non-state actors are finding it 
much easier to transport large quantities of small arms and light weapons.52 This illicit 
trade pays huge dividends to these small-scale organizations, but fuels instability in 
developing nations. Nation states throughout the world and especially in Africa are 
rapidly losing their monopoly over the use of armed violence and strict control over the 
flow of arms. Making matters worse is the fact that not only do some developing 
governments condone small arms and light weapons transfers, but they are also profiting 
from these sales to non-state actors.53 
A recent United Nation Panel of governmental experts on small arms and 
light weapons underscored the reality that conflicts are NOT caused by the 
small arms and light weapons themselves; rather the conflicts are caused 
by complex political, socio-economic, cultural and ideological factors. 
However, the supply of these weapons plays a major role in intensifying 
and prolonging both interstate and internal conflicts, increasing crime 
rates, violence and insecurity.54 
In Libya it is now estimated that more than 20,000 surface to air missiles, capable 
of shooting down civilian passenger jets, are missing, and are possibly in the hands of 
non-state actors.55 Richard Clarke, a former White House counterterrorism advisor 
recently stated, “I think the probability of al Qaeda being able to smuggle some of the 
stinger-like missiles out of Libya is probably pretty high.”56 The dark reality of this 
statement brings with it a nightmarish scenario for the entire world. Small groups of 
AQIM and Boko Haram operators possessing these weapons, could essentially walk out 
to airfields in multiple countries where civilian passenger jets are taxiing, and within 
minutes a number of them could be targeted and destroyed. The possibility of bringing 
commercial air flights all over the world to a sudden standstill is highly likely, with these 
attacks crippling the global economic system. Compare a series of these terrorist attacks 
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to what happened to the airliner industry in the wake of the 2010 volcano eruption in 
Iceland. It is estimated that this one volcanic eruption forced commercial airline 
companies around the world to lose more than $1.7 billion in business.57 This is not even 
taking into account the large losses in human capital due to people being stranded all over 
the world, not being able to work as efficiently as usual. This one single volcano brought 
an essential piece of globalization to a halt, and affected billions of people worldwide. A 
series of well-rehearsed and planned terrorist attacks of this magnitude would 
undoubtedly strike extreme fear into a population’s ability to not only fly on a regular 
basis, but would drastically undermine the legitimacy of some of the strongest state run 
governments in the world. This threat is real, but is not getting the attention needed to 
push government leaders to make fundamental changes to commercial airliners, save 
Israel. Israel recognizing this new reality recently started equipping commercial airliners 
with surface to air missile countermeasures, not strictly different what their military 
fighter jets are equipped with.58 The horrific terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
killed more than 3,000 people, but also caused massive monetary hardship on a number 
of nations. In the aftermath of these attacks it is estimated that more than $100 billion 
was lost.59 In addition, this forced the U.S. into a 10-year-plus war in Central and 
Southwest Asia, resulting in the deaths of more than 6,000 U.S. service members, 
wounding another 30,000, and costing through implicit and explicit means of more than 
$1 trillion, while of the same importance leaving tens of thousands of Iraqi and Afghani 
civilians dead or wounded.60 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
When taking an objective look into the problems facing governments that are 
attempting to contend with a more integrated union between Boko Haram and AQIM, it 
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is important to note what this merger and union are doing to the structure of African 
economies along with their political leaders, which subsequently impacts America’s 
foreign policy initiatives in the region. When a nation derives the majority of its wealth 
from criminal activities, and is one-dimensional in natural resources, it then becomes a 
slippery slope for political and military leaders to align themselves with criminals, 
because the payoffs are fast, hard to trace, and lucrative. This only breeds more erratic 
instability, which then accelerates the momentum of terrorist organizations, while 
escalating their public relations appeal.61 This coupled with a significant amount of a 
nation’s wealth being predominantly used for consumption purposes and personal gain, 
culminates into an acute patronage system that takes root, resulting in funds that are less 
likely to produce large investments in better education, infrastructure improvements, and 
well-rounded health care initiatives. Political leaders become bought commodities by 
drug traffickers, giving way to a perpetual cycle of greed, which in the end depresses real 
sustained incentives for economic growth, drastically hurting the average African on the 
street. Drug and human trafficking and weapons proliferation cannot be totally eradicated 
in Boko Haram and AQIM’s zones of operations, but can be managed to an extent in 
which it is at a reasonable level. Until this is the accomplished the U.S. strategic 
landscape in Africa will continue to face unforeseen challenges. 
Boko Haram and AQIM’s tactics are changing at all levels of operations. The 
attacks and kidnappings, along with methods of training, while working through a 
contraband market of drugs, guns, and human trafficking are impacting the entire North 
and West African regions. Both groups were assessed recently to be groups that were a 
somewhat minor threat, but now possess the ability to project their operations across 
many different borders.  What is troublesome is that as both groups evolve and merge 
with each other, they are placing substantial amounts of stress upon an array of African 
governments, forcing them to seek assistance from foreign powers. As these two groups 
build upon recent successes, and learn from each other, the typical response by African 
governments is to launch broad and indiscriminate security sweeps in zone on possible 
Boko Haram and AQIM strongholds, causing many innocent civilians to be caught in a 
                                                 
61Adesoji, “Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram.” 
 21 
large internal crossfire. This approach, in conjunction with the interjection of foreign 
powers, is creating an environment of profound instability. More focus from international 
governments on capacity building and partnership training needs to be linked forward in 
dealing with this growing threat. Otherwise the population within the confines of Boko 
Haram and AQIM will more than likely give more passive and active support to these 
groups and their operations.    
As Nigeria continues to gain strategic importance due to its large proven oil 
reserves, and boasting the largest populous nation in all of Africa, the linkages between 
Boko Haram and AQIM are becoming more than just a problem nuisance for outside 
powers to be concerned about. Given the reality that Nigeria is now the tenth-largest 
producer of oil in the world, contributes the most peacekeepers to the U.N in Africa, and 
possesses the ability to impact events not only within West Africa but throughout the 
subcontinent, the country finds itself in a situation where outside actors need it to be able 
to stabilize events within its own borders.  In order for Nigeria to truly quell the spread of 
radical Islam from Boko Haram, and the probability of further linkages between it and 
AQIM, the Nigerian government must focus more energy on combating some of the 
major driving forces, which are creating a thorough alliance between the two groups. 
According to the Bureau of African Affairs, 
Nigeria still ranks as one of the world’s poorest nations, with 75 percent of 
its population living off of $1.75 a day. The poverty rate in the Muslim 
north is stuck around 75 percent, compared to 27 percent in the Christian 
south, and most contentious is the fact that Nigeria now has a population 
where two thirds are under the age of 30.62 
The internal friction within Nigeria is causing enormous strain the entirety of the region. 
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III. BOKO HARAM 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Boko Haram is a terrorist organization that recently evolved out of northern 
Nigeria. The literal translation of Boko Haram means, “Western education is forbidden.”  
The group started out its original mission in 2002 with no more than a band of 15 fighters 
with its leader Mohammed Yusuf.  Mohammed Yusuf sought to use armed jihad against 
Nigerian government and security forces, in a series of deadly attacks. Yusuf was 
subsequently captured and killed by government security forces during a prison break in 
2003. The events leading up to his death are not widely known, leaving the possibility 
that he was murdered while in custody.  Yusuf’s death quickly made him a martyr, 
further igniting already lingering tensions in the region, and dramatically increasing the 
number of Boko Haram followers.  As of 2013, the number of Boko Haram operational 
fighters are estimated to be as high as 500. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCT OF BOKO HARAM 
The organizational construct of Boko Harm is contested, though, by various 
intelligence sources. This is partially due to information being gathered by Nigerian 
security forces, the concealment of operator identities, and ongoing efforts by 
international intelligence agencies. What is clear is that Boko Haram is gaining in 
strength and lethality. Since 2009, Boko Haram has forged stronger ties and links to 
AQIM. These ties are grounded in ideology, funding, and illicit trading through arms, 
drugs, and humans.63 These connections are being refined through operationally armed 
sects in the north by the group maintaining robust training camps in five different 
Nigerian states: Bornu, Kano, Kaduna, Adamawa, and Yola—see Figure 2.64 While the 
group is training and conducting attacks, its organizational construct is working to 
overcome constant reprisals from government security forces. As government forces 
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launch security sweeps in their zone, Boko Haram fighters have had to improvise their 
movements outside their normal zones of operation, including interstate movement of 
personnel through Niger and Mali. Changing tactics, organizational construct, operational 
design, and the identities of the fighters, are becoming the mainstay in how the group has 
eluded destruction from government forces. Although there is speculation by Western 
intelligence forces that foreign fighters have infiltrated Boko Haram, there is no tangible 
evidence to prove this theory.65 The group remains a homegrown entity that seeks (so 
far) to remain this way, outside of working and dealing with other terrorist organizations 
to receive funding, training, and other resources. Although this is the case for the time 
being, the aftermath of the Arab Spring, coupled with the Tuareg rebellion in northern 
Mali are changing the dynamics rapidly.66 These changes are of increasing concern to 
government policymakers, because the levels of coordination and cooperation could 
bring about a new set of problems to contend with, such as a unionized consolidation of 
numerous non-state actors to the point where declaring statehood is possible, if not 
probable.67 
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Figure 2.  Predominant Area of Operation for Boko Haram68 
Boko Haram’s organizational construct is developing more in numbers as fighters 
volunteer or are recruited. As the group’s operational forces continue to gain in numbers, 
the disposition of its forces changes according to its operational capabilities and 
requirements. One of these requirements is to ambush government forces and Christian 
followers from the northern region by waging indiscriminant attacks upon places of 
worship. The intent is to create one regional Islamic state in the north, by purging 
anything and everything viewed as “un-Islamic.”69 In order to achieve this desired end 
state, Boko Haram needs AQIM for training, advising, and funding, and since both 
groups have a shared vision and ideology, the threat that these groups project by an 
alliance, cannot be taken lightly. 
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C. WHAT DOES BOKO HARAM WANT? 
Boko Haram seeks to purge the northern region of Nigeria from anything 
considered Western, especially education. The group desires Sharia law in all 12 northern 
states, and actively pursues this through a highly developed campaign of violent attacks 
and suppression against its indigenous population. Since 2002, the group has modeled 
itself off Taliban preachings and modes of operations in Afghanistan. It officially referred 
to its original base as “Afghanistan.”70 The group sought to resist all Western ideologies, 
systems of economics, and strictly forbid any semblance of Western-style education to its 
children.71 Although initially it was a terrorist group with isolationist ambitions, it had to 
make significant changes to its modes of operations due to effective Nigerian security 
force countermeasures. However, these countermeasures did not totally weed out the 
hardliners within the group, and after Muhammad Yusuf’s death, the group reorganized 
itself underground, and seized upon the emotions of the local populace, then subsequently 
regrouped while waging an unprecedented wave of brutal attacks upon Nigerian security 
forces and its large Christian minority.72 
D. LINKAGES BETWEEN BOKO HARAM AND AQIM 
One of the chief concerns with Boko Haram is not knowing if the group has any 
substantial linkages and direct connections to al-Qaeda. From its original conception, 
there is little tangible evidence to prove that Boko Haram intended to establish links to al 
Qaeda.73  The group sought to void itself from Western-style democratic systems of 
governing. Although its original manifesto preached along the same lines as al-Qaeda, 
there are no real connections of noteworthy significance documenting a linkage between 
Boko Haram to al-Qaeda.74 In recent years though, the group has had to change its 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in order to survive. These changes are a direct 
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result from the harsh and repressive government crackdowns on members of the group 
and their bases of operations. As the group becomes more efficient in carrying out 
targeted killings, kidnappings, and mass suicide bombing attacks, Nigerian government 
security forces consequently use disproportionate large-scale security sweeps in those 
zones in order to disrupt any efforts for Boko Haram to reconstitute its forces.75 These 
broad security force sweeps have created a conducive environment for the group to 
become more transnational in nature. The group, being fully aware on where the 
international borders are, then uses these boundaries to their advantage. The border of 
Nigeria and Niger are a case in point. Boko Haram uses Taliban methods of operation 
and employment, staging cross-border hit-and-run attacks as they did in Pakistan to 
attack U.S. and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).76 The problems associated 
with fighting AQIM and Boko Haram, are that they then become compounded, in that 
there has to be a more concentrated effort from both host nation governments to bolster 
their borders with a better security apparatus. The border between Niger and Nigeria are 
ones in particular that need better enforcement, in order to efficiently counter the flow of 
fighters moving back and forth.77 
The fact that Boko Haram has been forced to improvise its tactics because of 
effective Nigerian security forces initiatives brings about concerns of a new dynamic in 
how the group operates. The group’s initial intention was to remain isolationist in nature. 
From its conception no real undertaking was architected to forge international ties. This 
evolution chartered a different course as Boko Haram suffered setbacks against 
overwhelming military and police advantages. As a result, the group is now aligning 
itself more methodically with AQIM and other affiliates. The group has had to become 
more transnational in order to survive. The problem associated with ungoverned territory 
has only helped Boko Harm in a survival sense. The group uses these empty and non-
regulated spaces to its advantage, and only when host nation governments build adequate 
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security zones in concert with better control measures over their borders, will the real 
likelihood of defeating Boko Haram become a reality.78 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Boko Haram seeks to create a breakaway state from Nigeria. Its intentions are 
specific; resist all forms of Western education and influence, implement Sharia law, 
establish an Islamic state, and finally, if conditions warrant itself for future survival, help 
establish a larger extension of statehood in Northern Nigeria and the Sahel, by forging 
alliances between AQIM along with other affiliates, such as al-Shabaab in East Africa.79 
Boko Haram inherently believes that the current state of Nigeria is infected and corrupted 
by Western and Christian governments, whose intent is to infringe on the rights of all 
Muslims and to extract its country’s abundance of petroleum.80 Although the group 
started out with a low number of operatives, it has evolved from an annoyance to a 
sizeable threat against the legitimacy of the Nigerian state. The organization proves that it 
possesses the wherewithal to withstand setbacks from government countermeasures, and 
learns how to adapt as it continues its operations. It does this while launching a well- 
thought out public relations campaign against the government, by latching on to the 
grievances of the population. Such grievances are large-scale wealth inequality, 
government corruption, and indiscriminate government security force crackdowns. All 
this leads to more frustrations and anger toward the Nigerian state, while increasing its 
numbers by the recruitment of disenfranchised youths.81 
Boko Haram linkages are becoming more profound with AQIM. Boko Haram 
uses transnational borders to achieve support in logistics, operations, intelligence, and 
public relations. Although the group originally did not start its operations and methods 
with the intention to become a transnational terrorist organization, it has been forced to in 
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order to survive. It uses models from other known terrorist organizations, such as The 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), AQIM, and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan by way of drug and human trafficking, small arms and light weapons 
proliferation (SALW), training, and money laundering. The paradox that hampers 
policymakers in Nigeria is that the harsh security measures executed against Boko Haram 
have created an environment for the group to become even more powerful and influential, 
while establishing more sustainable links to AQIM.82 
Nigeria is a nation that is dramatically split along ethnic and religious lines. Its 
constitution states, “that the office of the presidency will be rotated between Muslim and 
Christian citizens.”83 This adoption under constitutional law has recently come under 
intense friction because the current president is a Christian, who took over a Muslim 
president who died prematurely. This untimely death, and a replacement Christian 
president, only helped to ignite more complexities involving ethnic fault lines. Boko 
Haram continues to use this as an example of one of its major grievances against the 
state. This ethnic and religious friction is also compounded by the fact that the country’s 
vast oil reserves are located in the south of the country, causing internal competition and 
distrust between the north and south. This is even more prevalent throughout the region 
of the country where state governors tend to exert more influence because they are 
overseeing the extraction and sale of the petroleum to foreign mega corporations, and 
since these governors tend to be of Christian faith, they wield more influence over the 
office of the presidency.84 Until the Nigeria policymakers in the south can come to a 
reasonable and sustainable way forward in how to incorporate members of the north more 
thoroughly into the strategic decisions the country makes, no real tangible results will 
occur involving the ceasing of hostilities. 
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A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
AQIM, which evolved from a Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), 
was a branch off the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The GSPC lost the majority of its 
legitimacy from its indigenous population due to its brutal tactics against those who 
posed any type of resistance, while simultaneously being pushed out of its operating 
environment from successful Algerian government’s counterterrorism initiatives in the 
1990’s.85 As a result, the GSPC had to change trajectory and then morphed into its 
current platform, AQIM.86 The linkages forged through time and space in the region are 
grounded on numerous operational capabilities, which include the movement of foreign 
fighters, illegal drugs, small arms and light weapons proliferation, human trafficking, and 
reminisces from sponsors across the world.87 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCT OF AQIM 
AQIM is structured and organized into battalions. The total number of AQIM 
operators is estimated around 1,000.88 Each battalion is assigned to a “zone of operation” 
and inside each zone are approximately 300 fighters. See Figure 3.89 Although these 
battalions are fairly compatible in numbers with standard conventional military 
battalions, they operate in decentralized methods of operation. Most of these fighters 
consist of small cohesive teams that focus on quick hit-and-run tactics against the critical 
infrastructure of host nation states. Kidnapping, drug/human trafficking, and acquiring 
small arms and light weapons is predominant in their intent and objectives. 
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Figure 3.  AQIM’s Current Structure, Jane’s Defense (2010)90 
The official formation of AQIM was formally announced in January 2007.91 The 
group’s intent in doing this was to build a formal alliance with al-Qaeda Central (AQC). 
The objective of this alliance would be twofold. First, by announcing this alignment, it 
would then garner support in the form of resources from AQC. Second, this overt 
alignment would provide a venue for a public relations campaign for the targeted 
audience in the Maghreb. AQIM was created from an offshoot of GSPC, but evolved into 
a different construct due to grievances against the GSPC from other Islamist groups who 
sanctioned the GSPC for their brutal tactics against the population during its struggle 
with the Algerian government. The GSPC had a notorious history of decimating entire 
villages in their zones of operations. Anyone who remotely did not follow the GSPC’s 
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ideology or platform faced harsh penalties. These methods and tactics led the Algerian 
government to respond swiftly, and as a result the GSPC was forced to retreat into the 
Sahel, mainly in Northern Mali, Niger, and Chad.92 
Once AQIM found refuge in the Sahel, as seen in Figure 4, it was able to 
reorganize and reconstitute its forces. Along with this reconsolidation, the group became 
particularly aware of the shortsightedness of its extreme tactics against the local 
populace, and subsequently embarked on establishing linkages with the population 
through intermarriages in the local clans, building confidence with tribal elders through 
better social service initiatives, and finally ensuring that the people in these ungoverned 
lands were given adequate security against the encroachment of government and foreign 
forces.93 This change in tactics, and establishment of deeper linkages with the population 
in the Sahel, in particular the Tuaregs, helped the group to evolve into the current AQIM 
organization.94 
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Figure 4.  AQIM Area of Operation (2012) 95 
C. WHAT DOES AQIM WANT? 
AQIM seeks to obtain a regional area or Islamic state inside Africa. It bases its 
beliefs and projected ideology as an offshoot to AQC. As the group becomes more 
centralized, and builds upon its stated platform, it works aggressively to rid the Maghreb 
region of Africa from any foreign involvement. AQIM believes that any government 
established in what it believes to be their area of operation must immplement Sharia law, 
and if these governments refuse, they are therefore apostate “unbeliever” governments. 
Its main focus areas are to direct operations in Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, 
Morocco, and Tunisia. However, as AQIM is targeted by area governments and 
international or Westren-style governments, the group has had to change bases of 
operations, and continues to shift forces inside various terrortories. 
From a survival perspective this shifting of forces is compelling the group to 
merge with groups like Boko Haram and even al-Shabaab in Eastern Africa.96 From a 
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broader perspective, AQIM uses Islamic history in Africa as a method to justify its 
legiticimacy, in that it believes that the people of the Maghreb region have an internal 
right to take back what was taken from them in Spain, referring to the spread of Islam all 
the way into Spainish territory. This objective appears to be out of reach for the time 
being, but should be understood that the group has not forgotten its history in the region, 
and uses Islamic history to further generate grievances. 
D. LINKAGES BETWEEN AQIM AND BOKO HARAM 
From its inception, AQIM has sought out aggressively to become a transnational 
terrorist organization.97 In order for the group to fulfill its mission and intent, it needs to 
recruit members from all over the Sahel, and West Africa. Boko Haram’s original 
intention is to form a breakaway nation in Northern Nigeria. This separatist movement is 
in conjunction with its intent as an isolationist group, in that it wishes to form its Islamic 
state, and be left to exert its influence over the predominate Muslims in the 12 states.98 It 
seeks to do this through forced explosions of its large Christian minority back to the 
south.99 What is changing Boko Haram’s isolationist model is the ever-growing 
importance of AQIM in the region. Boko Haram’s recent setbacks are a direct result from 
effective Nigerian government security force operations in the Northern region, pushing 
Boko Haram into other areas outside and inside the Sahel, including Niger, Chad, Ivory 
Coast, and Burkina Faso.100 
In aftermath of the conflict in Libya during the Arab Spring, a large number of 
black Africans were forced out of Libya. These Africans were on the payroll of dictator 
Muammar Gaddafi. When the Gaddafi regime fell, with Gaddafi himself executed, these 
African mercenaries lost their livelihoods, leaving them with no option but to return back 
into the Sahel. These fighters, mainly from Tuareg ethnic dissent, returned home only to 
find their situation even more dire, because in the region of northern Mali, southern 
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Algeria, and portions of Niger, no sustainable form of infrastructure was in place to 
provide the means necessary for these fighters to earn a living.101 This gave way to large-
scale relative deprivation, while simultaneously building up grievances toward the 
established government.  
AQIM was already operating in the region and seized upon this vacuum by 
recruiting a number of these disenfranchised fighters.102 As AQIM gathered these 
fighters into their fold, the group’s influence and strength gained momentum. This   
contributed to AQIM’s rise in strength and influence. The vast numbers of weapons of 
which the Libyan army lost control compound the problem that local African 
governments face in confronting these groups.103 Enormous amounts of munitions 
bunkers were pilfered by fleeing fighters, bringing these weapons back to Sub-Saharan 
Africa. It is estimated that more than 20,000 shoulder-fired SAMs are still missing from 
weapons caches in Libya, causing a heightened concern that they may be used to shoot 
down civilian airliners.104 
With these new weapons and fighters, AQIM now has the means to further its 
intent on creating regional Islamic safe havens by the merger of various criminal 
networks and terrorist organizations, including Boko Haram.105  These linkages are being 
further forged by the growing dominance of globalization. The penetration of mass and 
social media, global transportation systems, economies of scale, internet usage, and 
global illicit trade, are making drug trafficking, weapons proliferation, the stealing of 
intellectual property, and forced migration of non-aligned ethnic groups even easier in 
order to help establish deeper ties among one another.106 
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The linkages being formed between Boko Haram and AQIM are becoming more 
widespread for distinct reasons resulting from an array of dynamics. AQIM needs more 
resources, contraband trafficking, and operatives in order to become a transnational 
terrorist organization, making an alliance with Boko Haram helpful in its desired end 
state. Boko Haram is facing even more pressure from effective government-backed 
incursions on their bases of operations. These two groups are increasingly finding 
attractive the opportunities to work with each other for a common cause, even if their 
methods and specific modes of operations have a different approach. Both groups want 
an Islamic state with strict obedience to Sharia law implementation, and both groups 
resist Western influences and encroachments on Muslim lands, while simultaneously 
having the need for funding, training, and other resources.107 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
AQIM is a terrorist organization that is gaining substantial influence not only in 
the Maghreb, but also throughout the Sahel and into West Africa. The Libyan debacle 
emanating from the Arab Spring is only increasing the magnitude of the problem in 
containing AQIM. The areas where AQIM is operating are ripe for insurrection, and 
compounding this problem is those areas are oversupplied with a massive amount of 
small arms, light weapons, and SAMs. What makes matters worse is the onset of a new 
dynamic; a more robust integration between AQIM and Boko Haram. This alliance built 
around common interests and ideology are increasing the probability of a breakaway 
region for both groups to form a possible state-like zone of operation consisting of 
ungoverned spaces in areas of Niger, Mali, Northern Nigeria, portions of Burkina Faso, 
and small areas in southern Algeria. 
The linkages between AQIM and Boko Haram are becoming more acute. This is 
despite ongoing efforts from host nation states and the international community, hence 
the 2013 French and AU invasion of Northern Mali. The fact that more military and 
security force suppression and projection are taking place in vicinity of their bases of 
operation, could possibly be only prolonging a conflict that needs to be suppressed more 
                                                 
107 Meehan and Speier, “Boko Haram: Emerging Threat.” 
 38 
thoroughly through a better state sponsored information operations campaign. This is not 
to state that interdiction measures should be adopted by host nation governments or the 
international community, but the longer these entities impose the use of harsh and 
repressive tactics, they are actually assisting both groups in their indirect desire to 
become more integrated.108 
AQIM has openly stated it wishes to become a transnational terrorist organization, 
and in order to do this more cohesively, it needs to consolidate resources, arms, 
contraband trade, and personnel. Disenfranchised groups operating near AQIM present a 
lucrative opportunity to merge an alliance into an organization that has more efficient and 
effective means in their stated missions and intents. An Arab Spring awakening in Sub-
Saharan Africa similar to the Arab Spring of the north, but stoked by the grievances of 
both AQIM and Boko Haram, is a possibility that should be of concern to leaders all over 
the world. Otherwise, the aftermath of such a tumultuous event could have drastic 
repercussions for the entire continent.109 
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V. U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN AFRICA: A 
DIFFERENT STRATEGY TO LINGERING PROBLEMS 
A. CHANGING THE STATUS QUO IN DEALING WITH BOKO HARAM 
AND AQIM 
One of the main issues in confronting and combating a more unionized merger 
between Boko Haram and AQIM is first and foremost understanding what the nature of 
the grievances are in keeping these groups viable. In Africa, most of the problems local 
governments must contend with is their populace believes they cannot provide essential 
services and security. In areas where there is hardly any government interaction or reach, 
Africans must build their own version of localism in order to insure that their basic needs 
are met.110 However, the normal response from external actors in fighting Boko Haram 
and AQIM is capacity building through military training exercises.111 Military exercises 
are a good way forward in building partnership and finding military solutions to combat 
possible security threats, but the vast majority of the issues associated with AQIM and 
Boko Haram stem from political and social problems.112 Both groups need support from 
local populations to survive, yet the majority of the local inhabitants in Boko Haram and 
AQIM’s are not loyal global jihadist, rather they are disenfranchised with their 
governments, and are desperately in need of assistance in their plight.113 
If the U.S. and other nations that are heavily involved in Africa want sustainable 
change, then the focus needs to be more on the building of African institutions. This is 
paramount over capacity-building military exercises. Additionally, if and when military 
exercises are being performed, external actors should highlight that the military’s main 
purpose is to uphold the country’s constitution, and protecting the welfare of its citizens, 
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versus propping up the presidential regime.114 If more focus can be placed on the 
building of civilian institutions, it is reasonable to assess that more long-term positive 
effects by way of industry and education will be the byproducts of change further in 
assisting a broader sector of the society. This will then hopefully lead to the 
establishment of a middle-class, giving way to a population that has the ability to make 
ends meet, and not relying on false government promises and turning to groups like Boko 
Haram and AQIM to assist them. Good governance needs to be at the forefront of U.S. 
interaction. Military partnership and exercises should be secondary. 
B. AFRICOM’S COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
The creation of The United States African Command (AFRICOM) was a 
fundamental reaction and acknowledgement by the U.S. Government that Africa was 
gaining in strategic importance. Prior to the creation of this command, Africa was divided 
between CENTCOM, PACOM, and EURCOM. It was believed that by creating this new 
command, military and policy leaders could streamline their efforts toward Africa in a 
more fluid manner, in that having one four-star general reporting directly to the Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF) on matters of strategy and operations, as opposed to being divided 
among three different commanders. AFRICOM would be labeled the “Command Plus” 
because it would be the first major command to have a fully integrated civilian 
component.115 AFRICOM’s commander would now have a Department of State (DoS) 
counterpart to help advise and implement DoS initiatives on the continent.116 This 
change in command structure promoted AFRICOM to be a command that was rooted 
more in its ability to connect with Africans through humanitarian efforts and other 
important issues like security corporation and disaster relief.117 This approach was 
somewhat different than typical combatant commands, which are more grounded in 
military operations and security sector reform. 
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Since AFRICOM’s inception, the command has been fighting a public relations 
campaign on all fronts. Much of the friction and resistance toward AFRICOM ironically 
came from inside the U.S. government.118 U.S. policy leaders felt as though the 
command was created hastily and without any real oversight.119 Congressman Donald 
Payne from New Jersey even stated that he was “shocked and dismayed that [he] 
basically woke up one morning only to find out that he and his staff were not even 
notified, or consulted on the creation of this new command.”120 The DoS was also 
initially angered by the fact that it was hardly briefed by the White House on its new role, 
and knew that by creating this “Command Plus,” the department would have to provide 
what scant personnel and precious resources it could toward this effort, while being fully 
engaged heavily in the rebuilding of Iraq and Afghanistan.121 In the backdrop of this 
homegrown resistance from U.S. leaders, Africans predominantly were not at all thrilled 
by this new command either.122 Much of the resistance from Africans was rooted in 
painful memories from their colonial experiences.123 Africans looked at this new 
command with distrust, and believed that AFRICOM, with its focus primarily on 
humanitarian and partnership initiatives, was nothing more than one large sales pitch for 
the international community.124 America’s real intentions were to establish deeper ties to 
the continent in order to extract resources, slow an expansive and projecting China, while 
also fighting their “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT).125 Another issue for U.S. 
policymakers to contend with was where to establish this new command. The vast 
majority of leaders and strategic planners felt as though the command should be 
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positioned on the continent. Liberia almost instantly proposed to have the command 
established in its country, while other nations such as South Africa deeply resisted the 
idea in that establishing AFRICOM in Africa was a direct violation of sovereignty.126 
Nevertheless after much debate and scrutiny from the U.S. Senate, AFRICOM was 
formally flagged and established at Kelly Barracks in Stuttgart Germany, February 1, 
2008.127 
Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance. We are committed to 
working with African nations to strengthen their domestic capabilities and 
the regional capacity of the African Union to support post-conflict 
transformations, consolidate democratic transitions, and improve 
peacekeeping and disaster responses.128 
As AFRICOM worked through an array of complex public relation dynamics, the 
command found itself wrestling with how to project itself upon the continent without 
fanning the flames of external discontent, namely from Africans. The command spent 
more than a year pushing forth an agenda that would harness all the action arms and lines 
of effort from not only the military but from a wealth of governmental agencies. The 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) would take the lead on 
developmental projects and efforts, while the DoS would work in concert with the 
military to propose diplomatic solutions. In a testimony before congress, Teresa Whelan, 
who was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, stated the following, 
“AFRICOM is about helping Africans build greater capacity to assure their own security 
to support a variety of security and economic assistance initiatives.”129 It was apparent 
that the intent of AFRICOM was to help Africans find solutions to their problems without 
any large-scale involvement from U.S. military forces. However, this intention and 
undertaking changed dramatically when the Arab Spring erupted in the nation of Libya. 
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In February 2011, intense civil unrest escalated all over Libya. The aftermath of 
the Arab Spring in Egypt spilled over into Libya, and as a result heavy fighting between 
those loyal to Mummar Qaddafi and members of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC) took place on a scale as never seen in the history of that nation.130 Mass atrocities 
from both sides were commonplace. Libya, the second-richest nation on the African 
continent and the region’s second-largest producer of oil, generated enormous concern 
and outrage from the international community.131 The nations of NATO immediately 
convened and began planning options and contingencies on how to intervene there. 
Likewise, AFRICOM was given at least initially Command and Control (C2) of this 
international intervention, and on February 26, 2011, backed by UN Security Council 
Resolution number 1970, Operation Odyssey Dawn commenced. This was to be 
AFRICOM’s baptism of fire.132 
During Operation Odyssey Dawn AFRICOM maintained command and control 
for no more than nine days, subsequently relinquishing its authority to the NATO 
command located in Brussels, Belgium.133 This quick handover by AFRICOM was 
twofold in intention. The first was to show the international community that Operation 
Odyssey Dawn was not an American unilateral undertaking; rather it was a coalition of 
NATO members and willing participants from members of the Arab League.134 Second, 
the policy and military leaders that created AFRICOM were extremely wary about how 
this operation would be perceived by Africans. The leaders were concerned that it would 
legitimize the Africans’ argument that AFRICOM was no different from any other 
combatant command; all the public relations salesmanship leading up to the creation of 
the new command was nothing more than a facade concocted by U.S. planners who, from 
the beginning, had ulterior motives and aspirations about gaining a foothold into 
Africa.135 
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C. OIL, TERRORISM, AND NON-STATE ACTORS 
While giving a speech in February 2007, former President Bush announced the 
creation of a new unified combatant command, stating 
U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) would promote U.S. national 
security interest and objectives in Africa and the surrounding waters. This 
new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and 
help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners 
in Africa. AFRICOM will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and 
security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals: good 
development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth.136  
The creation of AFRICOM was derived form strategic planners who finally 
recognized the growing importance and impact of Africa on the international system. 
Some of this strategy was a byproduct and reaction from the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, which made fighting transnational terrorism even more important 
anywhere in the world. Other issues involved the discovery of large oil reserves in the 
Gulf of Guinea, and China’s involvement on the continent. In the past, the African 
continent was divided among three different commands: United States Central Command 
(CENTCOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM), and mostly overseen by the 
United States European Command (EURCOM). Creating AFRICOM was seen as a way 
to streamline U.S. foreign policy initiatives, and military objectives in a more fluid 
manner. 
AFRICOM was created with original understanding from senior military planners 
that the continent was gaining significant importance in the strategic realm of geopolitics. 
The possible changes on approach and engagement toward Africa are grounded in three 
fundamental areas: newly discovered oil, predominantly located in the Gulf of Guinea, 
competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the growing threat and rise 
of rogue non-state actors.137 “Africa now exports over 60 percent of its oil to China, and 
17 percent to the United States.”138 What is important about these figures is that Africa is 
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viewed by many to be a safety net for importing oil and as an alternative to the Middle 
East, which suffers from constant internal volatility. The nations of Equatorial Guinea, 
Angola, and Gabon are undergoing fundamental economic structural changes due to 
recent discoveries of large oil reserves in the past ten years, and are being invested in 
heavily by China.139 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which possesses 
enormous amounts of mineral wealth, is widely viewed as a priority for resource 
extraction initiative from China, possibly pushing General Ham, in making DRC the 
“main effort” target country for AFRICOM’s projection.140 
D. BOKO HARAM AND AQIM: AFRICOM’S ENDURING CONFLICT 
The rise of non-state actors on the African continent is causing AFRICOM to 
change its priorities and how it projects itself. As previously stated AFRICOM’s original 
intent was to be a command not grounded in typical combatant command TTPs. Its 
original construct was slated to approach the continent with an array of action arms from 
not just the military, but also from civilian entities, and center its mission essential tasks 
list (METL) around humanitarian efforts.141 As AFRICOM became more engaged in 
Africa, the command is finding itself having to focus much of its effort on combating 
groups like Boko Haram and AQIM. The following is AFRICOM’s original draft mission 
statement as briefed in a congressional testimony on the 8th of December 2007: 
U.S. Africa Command promotes U.S. National Security objectives by 
working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen 
stability and security in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). U.S. African 
Command leads the in-theater Department of Defense (DoD) response to 
support other U.S. Government (USG) agencies.  In concert with other 
USG and international partners, U.S. Africa Command conducts theater 
security cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and 
improve accountable governance. As directed, U.S. Africa Command 
conducts military operations to deter aggression, and respond to crises.142  
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1. The Difference Three Years Makes 
Less than three years later, the incoming commander, General Carter Ham briefed 
Congress and other U.S. government affiliates the following: 
Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the 
United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states 
and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military 
operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide 
a security environment conducive to good governance and 
development.143 
2. The Commander’s Intent for U.S. Africa Command 2011 
To protect the U.S. homeland, American citizens abroad, and our national 
interests from transnational threats emanating from Africa; and through 
sustained engagement, to enable our African partners to create a security 
environment that promotes stability, improved governance, and continued 
development.  Should preventive or enabling efforts fail, we must always 
be prepared to prevail against any individual or organization that poses a 
threat to the United States, our national interests, or our allies and 
partners.144 
3. Key Tasks for U.S. Africa Command 
• Deter or defeat al-Qaida and other violent extremist organizations 
operating in Africa and deny them safe haven. 
• Strengthen the defense capabilities of key African states and regional 
partners. Through enduring and tailored engagement, help them build 
defense institutions and military forces that are capable, sustainable, 
subordinate to civilian authority, respectful of the rule of law, and 
committed to the well-being of their fellow citizens. Increase the capacity 
of key states to contribute to regional and international military activities 
aimed at preserving peace and combating transnational threats to security. 
• Ensure U.S. access to and through Africa in support of global 
requirements. 
• Be prepared, as part of a whole of government approach, to help protect 
Africans from mass atrocities. The most effective way in which we do this 
is through our sustained engagement with African militaries. 




• When directed, provide military support to humanitarian assistance 
efforts.”145 
By taking an objective look at these two different mission statements and key 
tasks, one might observe that the nature of the missions and priorities for AFRICOM 
have dramatically changed from having a center of focus on humanitarian assistance, to 
working with African partners in order to disrupt, dismantle, and to destroy rogue non-
state actors. This shift in focus is mainly due to the mounting pressures Boko Haram and 
AQIM are inflicting upon the legitimacy of the state. The aftermath of the Arab Spring in 
North Africa is also resonating with other groups throughout the continent such as the 
Lord’s Resistance Army in Southern Africa, and al-Shabaab operating in Sudan, Kenya, 
and Somalia.146 
An alliance between AQIM and Boko Haram is of chief concern for AFRICOM 
planners and policy-makers. As these groups become more organized and effective in 
their operations, they will continue to drive changes in how external governments engage 
with host nation governments. Africans will use these changes in approach to say, “We 
told you so,” and that the creation of AFRICOM was more of a front for other 
intentions.147 However, to look at the problem from a holistic perspective, it is quite 
cumbersome for AFRICOM to focus the majority of its priorities of humanitarian 
assistance programs when there are threats from groups like Boko Haram and AQIM 
materializing at a rapid rate. It is only natural for military commanders to shift priorities 
to be centered around security operations, when the threat of attacks is highly likely. 
What is significant is how much emphasis is placed upon combating terrorism as opposed 
to providing things like humanitarian assistance, security corporation, and security sector 
reform. 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The U.S. foreign policy changes toward Africa stemming from the conclusion of 
the Cold War are being driven by several factors. These include but are not limited to: the 
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recent discovery of large proven petroleum reserves in the Gulf of Guinea, China’s 
growing influence on the continent, the explosive and lucrative contraband trade 
involving the illicit sale of narcotics, the large movement of humans, the mass 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and finally and equally important, the rise 
of rogue terrorist groups that are becoming more sophisticated and organized.148 The 
creation of an African Command was not just a reaction by U.S. political leaders to build 
more bureaucracy or to legitimize their current employment. This command was created 
as recognition that Africa cannot be approached in the same context as it was in the past. 
Africa now boasts more than one billion inhabitants, and is a continent that has the 
geography that can encompass the continental U.S., Europe, China, and India all 
together.149 Just traveling by air from Paris to South Africa is an 11-hour flight. All of 
these factors combined with the growing influence by groups like Boko Haram and 
AQIM will force the U.S. and China to pay more attention to what transpires on the 
continent. As African nations mature in political structure and gain a firmer grasp on 
geopolitics, they will play a more decisive role in the international community through 
their voting powers at the UN. Although the Obama administration recently stated in its 
new defense strategy that the Pacific Rim nations will influence American foreign policy 
initiatives for the foreseeable future, the presence of numerous non-state actors and the 
threat of them becoming more unionized in Africa will force the region to stay at the 
forefront of priorities for current and future administrations.150 
One lingering question: what will the future be for AFRICOM and its mission 
toward the continent? This question should not just be answered from the National 
Security Strategy; it also comes down to how important Africa will be to U.S. 
international interest. Even with slated budget constraints looming that will subsequently 
have a large impact on America’s armed forces in the future, Africa will continue to play 
a major role in U.S. foreign policy. This is not just due to oil, terrorism, and China, but 
more importantly, the other comparative changes that are taking place in Africa. Africa’s 
                                                 




GDP is growing sharply compared to the rest of the world, and as a result a large 
proportion of Africans are being pulled out of poverty.151 This even with acute wealth 
inequality will result in better opportunities for Africans to achieve higher levels of 
education, while helping to facilitate and to establish a middle class. The security issues 
on the continent will almost always drive AFRICOM’s approach because although 
AFRICOM is a command that integrates other civilian entities and agencies, it will 
always maintain a military posture. 
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VI. THESIS CONCLUSION 
“When fighting an insurgency, killing the enemy is easy. However, finding the 
enemy is damn near impossible.”152 
Finally, it is imperative in understanding the importance behind the motives of 
groups like AQIM and Boko Haram. An alliance between these groups will change the 
dynamics on how different nations in Africa are perceived by the international 
community. AQIM and Boko Haram are not just some annoyance that countries like Mali 
and Nigeria have to put up with. These groups are a legitimate threat to the stability of the 
West and North African regions.153 As these groups learn to adapt and morph their TTPs, 
they will likely become even more of a threat as long as they are not thoroughly dealt 
with. The international community needs to help assist the AU in not only combating 
these groups, but building trusted networks in AQIM and Boko Haram’s zones of 
operation. Using a constant heavy-handed approach against these groups cannot be the 
predominant course of action in suppressing a merger between them. What needs to be 
built upon is for the AU working with North and West African nations to develop an 
enhanced strategy of partnership combined with targeting the problem, in order to kill the 
disease, versus treating the symptoms. The problems and questions that need to be 
addressed are why are Africans continually being won over by terrorist organizations to 
join their cause, and what are the conditions that are driving people to support them in the 
areas where they operate?  
Defining success by fighting AQIM and Boko Haram from the standpoint of 
numbers of fighters killed or captured are limited victories that will only help 
governments win at the tactical level of warfare. In order for AQIM and Boko Haram to 
be destroyed at their core, host nation governments must take on an entirely new 
approach. This approach needs to be formed on the basis of understanding that destroying 
AQIM and Boko Haram could take at least a decade, if not longer, because governments 
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are not just fighting people, they are fighting an idea. Coupled with this understanding of 
time versus conditions, fighting AQIM and Boko Haram will require a broad-based 
public relations campaign. AQIM and Boko Haram have their message. The nations that 
are impacted by a relationship between AQIM and Boko Haram also have their message, 
and fighting a message can be much more complicated than fighting a kinetic conflict. 
The threat of a merger and more thorough integration between AQIM and Boko 
Haram is underway. Currently, there are military assessments and academic debates on 
the nature and size of the threat, and whether the union between AQIM and Boko Haram 
constitutes a clear and present danger for North and West Africa, in conjunction with 
Europe, and the U.S. homeland.154 In the early stages of AQC it was believed by 
international policymakers and strategists that AQC was more of a regional threat, and 
the possibilities of a spectacular attack on the U.S. homeland was written off as possible, 
but not probable.155 After the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, AQC 
picked up momentum in their operations and proved to be a legitimate threat to be 
understood and taken seriously. What makes matters more alarming is that the current 
state of CT initiatives in the Sahel region from the AU, host nation countries, and most 
recently the French with their deployment of forces to Mali, have been met with stiff 
resistance, and have not achieved the necessary objectives in order to stabilize the region 
for long-term security and prosperity.156 Without a projected campaign strategy to 
establish an environment that builds prosperity in the region, coupled with a partnership 
union of the affected states, no sustainable future of peace will be achieved. The way 
forward is for the region and the international community to first understand that this 
threat is real, and will likely get much worse in time if immediate conflict resolution 
methods are not implemented. Additionally, as peacekeepers surge into the area to help 
fight off the escalation of operations and attacks from AQIM and Boko Haram, a 
concerted effort needs to be adopted on how to build upon short-term gains. Otherwise 
the likelihood more protracted violence with instability will be the result. 
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A. THESIS SUMMARY 
The final chapter of this thesis will summarize how the findings were acquired in 
conjunction with a way forward for U.S. military policy-makers and planners in order to 
build a strategy to prevent an alliance between AQIM and Boko Haram. The major take 
away from this thesis is to build an understanding behind the history of AQIM and Boko 
Haram, what the factors and nature of the problems are in dealing with a more organized 
merger between the two groups, and what needs to be done in the future from 
AFRICOM, NATO, EU, AU, with various host nations in the affected regions. Most of 
the problems discussed are not just African problems. The motto “African solutions to 
African problems” should be the preferred and desired end state for fixing complex 
issues, but cannot be the excepted political mantra, when some of the big problems that 
are manifesting in Africa are external in origin. 
B. THE WAY FORWARD 
1. AFRICOM’s Current Strategy in the Sahel 
The U.S. foreign policy against AQIM and Boko Haram bases the majority of its 
strategy on using the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTP) which was 
established shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.157 This initiative has 
had mixed results, and needs refinement. The TSCTP focuses entirely too much off CT 
initiatives on kill or capture missions versus building capacity for African security forces. 
Also, the TSCTP still places the majority of its focus on its original target countries, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad.158 Nigeria has been recently included, but is 
secondary in order of precedence.159 The real dilemma is defining what previous 
operations from the TSCTP were successful, and what needs to be the future approach of 
the TSCTP. External actors are quick to gauge TSCTP successes through a Western lens. 
Yet, if the TSCTP is such a proven success, then why is the AQIM and Boko Haram 
threat growing in scope, why are there persistent attacks, and why are the French now 
                                                 




deployed to disrupt and dismantle AQIM threats in Mali? What needs to be the priority is 
for external actors to create more funding and training that should be centered around 
building capacity for African partnership nations with the understanding of taking control 
of the situation on the ground, where AQIM and Boko Haram typically operate. 
During this current period of fiscal austerity for military forces across Europe and 
the U.S., operations in Africa will probably take a secondary role against other threats 
like North Korea, continued volatility in the Middle East, and competing interest such as 
the new Pacific Rim strategy, so a new model of military projection in the Sahel needs to 
be framed with even better imagination. Doing less with less, will more than likely be the 
motto for U.S. military and policymakers for the foreseeable future in Africa. With this 
stated, though, this should not at all underestimate the nature of the threat in the Sahel. 
Without a comprehensive 10 plus year strategy in dealing with the complex and layered 
problems in AQIM and Boko Haram’s zones of operations, the possibility for larger and 
more dangerous outcomes are real. 
2. Doing Less with Less 
“He who tries to defend everything, defends nothing.”160 
With current ongoing debates over massive defense cuts, a possible complete 
overhaul of the current structure of the COCOMs could be forthcoming. These budget 
cuts, which by some estimates of $1.2 trillion over the next 10 years to the U.S. Military, 
are going to force strategic planners and commanders to reevaluate the current structure 
now more than ever. As funding dries up, commanders will have to fight harder to gain 
access to resources and personnel, and selling the importance of their command to DoD 
officials will be the mainstay. Africa has never received the attention it needs in order to 
deal with the host of problematic issues confronting governments there. In this new age 
of financial austerity, projecting and putting forth security policies that have an impact on 
the continent will be cumbersome. 
The strategic landscape around the world is changing dramatically. The Arab 
Spring in the Middle East and North Africa was not predicted by many foreign policy 
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think tanks or military planners. Over the course of one year starting in December 2010, 
the world has had to deal with a new reality in that the status quo of numerous 
authoritarian regimes are being eliminated one by one. China and India together now 
constitute 30 percent of the world’s total population, and have economies of scale 
growing at accelerating rates. In late 2011, President Obama announced a new grand 
strategy focused on the Pacific, while withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan. Just these 
few monumental changes, coupled with the strong probability that there will be acute 
budget cuts, has policymakers, strategic planners, and military commanders reassessing 
where the U.S. needs to really focus its time, resources, and energy. The U.S. Navy could 
be forced to readdress its obligation on having a 365-day a year forward presence 
throughout the world, mainly protecting the global trade sea-lanes. The amount of 
spending needed to keep the US Navy in a constant forward presence posture will likely 
come under considerable scrutiny from U.S. policymakers and American taxpayers. This 
will more than likely have an impact on operations focused on Africa, because of 
limitations on force projection capabilities and platforms. 
3. Recommendations for a New Way Forward 
a. Designed U.S. African Integrated Standby Force 
The U.S. Army is currently creating regionally aligned brigades with the 
intent to rotate units responsible for different regions around the world. One brigade from 
the 1st Infantry Division out of Fort Reilly, Kansas, is now being designated to be the 
brigade in support of AFRICOM.161 Although this is a step in the right direction, to date, 
no units have been formally assigned under the C2 of AFRICOM, and the fact that these 
units will be on a rotational basis does not build for long-term success. Although 
AFRICOM has put forth a campaign that is more humanitarian centric in its interactions 
and operations on the continent, the command needs to have assigned a permanent 
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) that is in close proximity to the command headquarters. 
Placing a brigade eight time zones away on a rotational basis to be surged into theater, 
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should not be the preferred method of operating. Additionally, this brigade needs to focus 
its alignment with the African Standby Force from the AU, and should not be building its 
force projection or training on its own. Everything it does should be geared toward 
building capacity for the African Standby Force. This twofold approach will help both 
DoD and the AU, in that funding and training can be pooled together. As funding gets 
restricted for U.S. military forces in this age of sequestration, partnership and building 
capacity will help meet mission requirements, and establish better relationships between 
the AU and the U.S. 
b. Help African Governments Establish a Resource Pension Fund 
Resource-rich nations in Sub-Saharan Africa face a distinct paradox. If a 
particular African nation has no natural resources to export or even use internally, then 
what other viable means does it have to prosper? However as pointed out by Paul Corrier, 
“In more recent times, resource-poor countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore have been able to build strong economies at the same time that their resource-
rich counterparts like Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela have been beset with economic 
calamities.”162 The contemporary history of resource-rich nations in Africa has proven to 
be extremely problematic.163  The exploitation of natural resources in Africa has ushered 
in an environment of authoritarian regimes that are reluctant to give up power through an 
electoral process, while consolidating revenues for them and their clientele. What makes 
matters worse for these nations is the lack of state structure and the weakness of political 
corporate governance.164 The amount of resources in much of these Sub-Saharan 
countries, if managed well, are enough to provide for the whole of their populations. 
However, significant corruption tends to take hold with large sums of money 
disappearing into offshore bank accounts. This cycle of corruption breeds frustration and 
anger on the local populace, leading them to become more and more disenfranchised. 
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Ethnic rivalry takes hold, creating an environment ripe for conflict and instability.165 The 
lack of leadership in Africa also makes the situation even worse than it already is. 
Africans at the local level have been using Western style of governance techniques for 
hundreds of years, but this form of localism did not move from the bottom up to the 
regional and nation level fast enough. After independence, a large number of African 
leaders became neocolonialist, and instead of liberating their people and embracing 
democratic reform, they chose the route of brutal suppression and oppression. 
The most problematic issue in relationship to resource abundance in Sub-
Saharan Africa and how this abundance escalates and extends conflict, is the combination 
between this lack of decent leadership in African governments in conjunction with an 
international community that lacks the moral intestinal fortitude to enact policies that 
could bring about fundamental positive change. The discovery of precious resources 
needed in newly developed technologies—such as cobalt used in cell phones and large 
finds of commodities by the way of oil—have changed Sub-Saharan Africa extremely 
fast. However, with this change over the past thirty years, protracted and persistent civil 
wars have been the mainstay, and if drugs are considered a precious resource than the 
likelihood of more African civil wars in the future are probable.166 This is due to the 
exponential increase in drug smuggling through West Africa into Europe. The crux of the 
resource issue goes back to the correlation in having an abundance of resources and the 
likelihood of having an increase in civil wars. The number of civil wars in Africa versus 
the rest of the world since the 1990s should cause African leaders to take notice, and 
make swift changes in how they distribute capital within their borders. Having resource 
abundance will not last forever, and by reinvesting the revenue back into a nation’s 
society by ways of infrastructure, education, security sector reform, and health care 
initiatives will only help a nation to become more prosperous for the long-term.167 
America and other nations such as China need to help resource-rich 
nations in Africa form the establishment of resource pension fund, not unlike what the 
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nation of Norway has adopted, or the Alaskan oil fund. Either one of these approaches 
would be much better than what is currently being implemented. One of the major 
reasons that African nations suffer from acute relative deprivation is that there is no real 
method to distribute funds being generated from the exports of precious resources. In 
Norway, once it was verified that large proven reserves of oil were found, the 
government immediately established a pension fund for its people with the intent to stave 
off “Dutch Disease.”168 Norwegians now get to share the profits that are being produced 
from oil in the form of a retirement fund, which in the long run builds a social safety net 
for the people there. In Alaska, a resident of that state gets a yearly stipend from the total 
profits generated, which at a minimum helps its economy through consumption purposes. 
Both programs at least give people residing in these areas the ability to reap the benefits 
of having resources.169 
By not having any type of resource-backed program that can be filtered to 
the local populations in Africa, initiated to distribute wealth accumulated from the 
exports of resources, rogue non-state actors like AQIM and Boko Haram will continue to 
build a public relations campaign discrediting government actions. The locals inhabiting 
these countries where AQIM and Boko Haram operate will continue to see the rich 
getting richer, while having them live in poverty with no real chance of escape. Hope will 
be an afterthought. DoS and DoD leaders should at least help sovereign nations in Africa 
devise a plan that addresses these issues, in order to give them different options. Trying 
this program could help alleviate some of the major frustrations Africans feel toward 
their governments, and could possibly help to dry up future prospects/recruits for AQIM 
and Boko Haram. 
C. THESIS CONCLUSION 
At the time of writing this thesis, conditions are being driven and built upon for 
the merger of AQIM and Boko Haram into an alliance that will constitute a significant 
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threat to stability in the Sahel. Other terrorist organizations are watching the development 
of these two groups and are learning from their success and mistakes. AQIM and Boko 
Haram have openly stated that they are willing to share their methods and doctrine to 
other aspiring terrorist organizations in order to spread their ideology across the entire 
African continent. Much of this merger is due to the Arab Spring, which started in 
December 2010. The impact from the collapse of the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan 
governments are creating enormous and sweeping changes throughout the sub-continent. 
The dynamics that are being played out at an accelerating rate are making it extremely 
difficult for state governments to gain a grasp on. As governments respond, they are 
finding the problems that have beset them are layered and complex. Large-scale security 
sweeps and crackdowns from host nation militaries and from the international community 
will not be the precursor for success. Helping Africans to build prosperity through the 
establishment of industry and economies of scale should lead to a better way forward for 
not just Africa, but for the whole of the international community.170  
If the U.S. and other nations that are heavily involved in Africa want sustainable 
change, then the focus needs to be more on the building up of African institutions. This is 
paramount over capacity-building military exercises. Additionally, if and when military 
exercises are being performed, external actors should highlight that the military’s main 
purpose is to uphold the country’s constitution, and protecting the welfare of its citizens, 
versus propping up the presidential regime. 171 If more focus can be placed on the 
building of civilian institutions, it is reasonable to assess those more long-term positive 
effects by way of industry and education will then be the byproducts of change further in 
assisting a broader sector of the society. This will then hopefully lead to the 
establishment of a middle-class, giving way to a population that has the ability to make 
ends meet, and not relying on false government promises, while turning to groups like 
Boko Haram and AQIM to assist them. Good governance needs to be at the forefront of 
U.S interaction. Military partnership and exercises should be secondary. 
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